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In the early 1970s, the gap between male and female unemployment rates in the
U.S. labor market was significantly large. Several studies raised concerns about this
disparity and there was a cry for gender egalitarianism [Barrett and Morgenstern,
1974; Lingle and Jones, 1978; Niemi, 1974]. Using the data from the same period, a
number of other studies estimating male-female wage differentials demonstrated that
women, in general, also received lower wages than otherwise identical male workers
[Oaxaca, 1973; Blau and Beller, 1988; Gill, 1989; Hersch, 1991]. Thus, the 1970s, like
the 1960s, experienced both employment and wage trends that in general were unfa-
vorable to women.
Several authors attributed the large gender gaps in wages and employment in
the U.S. labor market during the 1960s and 1970s partly to the presence of employ-
ers’ discrimination against females [Niemi, 1974; Oaxaca, 1973]. Their conclusion is
supported in Becker’s [1971] famous theory of taste discrimination, which suggests
that in a labor market infused with gender discrimination, a female job applicant
would be hired only if the employer’s disutility of having such an employee is fully
neutralized by lower costs of hiring her. Thus, gender discrimination, according to
Becker’s theory, leads to both lower wages and higher unemployment rates for women.
In the presence of widespread labor market discrimination in the 1970s, the conclu-
sion drawn by several authors that the adverse wage-employment scenario facing
women during this period may partly be due to employers’ discriminatory attitudes
towards female employees seems reasonable.
Interestingly, the employment scenario started to change dramatically in favor
of women in the early 1980s. The gender gap in female and male unemployment
rates started to show a declining trend and during the late 1980s it converged almost
to zero [Economic Report of the President, 2001; DeBoer and Seeborg, 1989]. In the
1990s, this gender gap remained close to zero for most part of the decade, and at
times, the female unemployment rate even fell below the male unemployment rate.
During the same period, however, the male-female wage differential presented a
different scenario. Although the differential narrowed throughout the 1980s, it re-
mained well above zero. In fact, the female-male wage ratio, after remaining around
0.6 between 1930 and 1980, increased to .72 by 1990 [O’Neill and Polachek, 1993].70 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The evidence of zero or even negative gaps between female and male unemployment
rates along with large gender wage gaps raises the following questions: (1) Why were
the unemployment rates of males and females equal when their wages were far apart?
and (2) Does the zero unemployment rate gap during the late 1980s signal the ab-
sence of employers’ hiring discrimination against females during that period?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine whether a zero unemploy-
ment rate gap can coexist with a substantially large wage gap, and how labor market
discrimination affects such a wage-employment scenario. Several studies in different
contexts have provided different explanations for why a zero unemployment rate gap
may exist simultaneously with a sizeable wage gap. First, inaccurate measurement
may lead to an incorrect conclusion regarding the equality of male and female unem-
ployment rates [Johnson, 1983]. In fact, prior to the 1994 revisions of the Current
Population Survey (CPS) data collection, unemployment rates for women were slightly
underestimated because interviewers often assumed out-of-labor force status, instead
of unemployed status, for women who appeared as housewives. [Monthly Labor Re-
view, 1993] Under the revised procedure, female unemployment rates in the late 1980s
and the early 1990s exceed the reported rates by approximately 0.8 percentage point.
The male-female unemployment rate equality in the late 1980s may not therefore be
considered as a true equality in a mathematical sense.1
Second, the female-dominated service sector remained more or less unaffected
by the fluctuations in business cycles during the 1980s, whereas the male-dominated
manufacturing sector experienced a secular decline in employment [Bluestone and
Harrison, 1988]. These changes in the demand for male and female workers were
partly responsible for closing the gap in male and female unemployment rates. No
such trend, however, was found for wages, and consequently the wage gap continued
to persist during the 1980s.
Several authors have demonstrated that due to traditional family obligations,
women, especially those who are married and have children, may prefer to work part
time. They may also prefer to work in low-skill jobs that do not require further invest-
ments in education and training. [Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998] All these jobs,
however, are low-paying in nature, and consequently female wages, in general, are
lower than wages of male workers with otherwise identical characteristics. Thus,
considering the nature of women’s jobs, it is not surprising to find that the unemploy-
ment rates of men and women converge while their wages remain far apart.
An alternative demand-side explanation of the conflicting evidence just men-
tioned follows from the possibility that labor market discrimination may lead indi-
rectly to occupational segregation. Discriminatory attitudes of employers, co-work-
ers and customers towards women adversely affect women’s incentives to invest in
education, and consequently, they acquire fewer skills and end up in low-paying jobs
[Blau, ibid., Ch. 6]. The presence of statistical discrimination, resulting from incor-
rect perception of employers regarding low productivity and job instability of women,
also plays a crucial role in forcing women to be placed in low-paying occupations
[Aigner and Cain, 1978; Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1972]. Discrimination of any type (sta-
tistical or otherwise), through its feedback effects, may lead to occupational segrega-
tion that results in overcrowding of women in a few low-paying, so-called female71 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
occupations [Bergmann, 1974]. This overcrowding lowers their wages still further.
Thus, while the unemployment rate of women declines and converges to that of men,
their wages lag due to the type of jobs they have.
Another explanation of the problem under consideration follows from the quality-
sorting hypothesis. Recently, Holzer [1998] has demonstrated that the rising employer
skill demand contributes substantially to changes in relative employment outcomes
across different demographic groups. He finds the evidence that employer skill de-
mand has a positive effect on the employment of white women. Since white women
constitute a significantly large percentage of the total employed female population,
the narrowing of the gender unemployment rate gap in the 1980s may have resulted
from an increase in the skill demands by the employers during that period.2 The
gender wage gap, on the other hand, is known to be affected adversely by the same
quality sorting behavior of the employer because it leads to further segregation. In a
recent study, Carrington and Troske [1998] have shown that the extent of gender
segregation between firms in the U.S. labor market is substantial and that it results
partly from employers’ quality sorting (or skill demand). They find the evidence that
wages are generally lower in plants that are predominantly staffed by women. Thus,
irrespective of the source of segregation, the evidence suggests that women are sys-
tematically selected into occupations or plants where they earn less, and consequently
the gender wage gap persists even if the unemployment rates have converged.
Several other theories explain why a substantial positive wage gap may coexist
with a near-zero gap in male and female unemployment rates. All these theories
agree that discrepancies in wages of identical male and female workers do not contra-
dict the possibility of an equality of male and female unemployment rates. None of
these theories, however, examines the possible causal connection between these two
differentials. In his seminal article on the theory of discrimination, Arrow [1972] dem-
onstrates that although the hiring decision of a discriminating employer is governed
to a large extent by the prejudice against women, it is not completely independent of
the profit motive. One of the variables that significantly influences the profits and
hence the hiring policy of an employer is the wage that would be paid if the worker
were hired. Under the assumption that a discriminating employer also maximizes
profits, the employer will hire a lower wage worker with other characteristics includ-
ing productivity, held constant. Since in the presence of wage discrimination, women
in general are paid lower wages than otherwise identical men, a profit-maximizing
employer may hire more females than would be hired otherwise. This leads to a
decline in the female unemployment rate which, of course, cannot be attributed to
employers’ favoritism towards female workers. Thus, the equality of male and female
unemployment rates in the United States during the late 1980s does not necessarily
indicate the absence of gender discrimination. This equality may, in fact, be attrib-
uted partly to the employer’s ability to pay lower discriminatory wages to otherwise
identical female employees.
Using the U.S. data from the 1980s, the current study tests the above implica-
tion of Arrow’s argument, thus providing another alternative explanation of why
male and female unemployment rates were equal in the late 1980s even as large
discrepancies between average male and female wages remained. The study claims72 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
that the convergence of male and female unemployment rates in the U.S. labor mar-
ket, although real, was not truly complete in the late 1980s. It was the very presence
of wage discrimination against females during this period that, by increasing female
employment, still further closed the remaining gap, leading to the observed equality
of male and female unemployment rates.
It is important to note that the study of the relationship between wage discrimi-
nation and employment just mentioned is not new in the literature. In a remarkable
study, Baldwin and Johnson [1992] have demonstrated that wage discrimination
against women by creating disincentive effects causes significant job losses. Their
study focuses primarily on the effect of wage discrimination on the supply of female
labor. The current study, on the other hand, focuses only on the demand side. This is
the first study in the literature that, by following a demand-side approach, demon-
strates that the increase in female employment results partly from a rise in the
employer’s demand for female workers whose wages, due to the presence of gender
discrimination, are generally lower than the wages of otherwise identical males.
ESTIMATION ISSUES AND SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS
This section examines different estimation and sampling issues for testing the
hypothesis that the presence of wage discrimination against females leads to a de-
cline in the female unemployment rate. The test of such a hypothesis requires devel-
oping a framework that models the relationship between workers’ individual dis-
criminatory wages and the aggregate unemployment rate. Both of these rates, how-
ever, are related to workers’ employment probabilities.3 Estimation of these prob-
abilities from male and female samples therefore is crucial to test the hypothesis
proposed in this study. The following subsection presents a standard employment
model, outlines the relationship between these three important variables (employ-
ment probability, wage rate and unemployment rate), and suggests an appropriate
testing procedure.
Estimating Equations
The employment probability of the ith worker, at a given point in time, depends
on the employer’s preference function for that worker (yi), which is defined as the
utility derived from the worker’s expected contribution minus the utility sacrificed
on account of the payment of wages. The variable yi therefore depends on the worker’s
personal and human capital characteristics (Zi) and the log wage rate (lnwi) that the
employer will have to pay if the worker is hired. The employer hires the ith worker
only if yi > 0. Thus,
(1) EMPi =1 , i f  yi > 0
= 0, otherwise, where
(2) yi = Zi   +   lnwi +  i.73 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
The structural employment probability of the ith worker therefore reduces to
(3) P (EMPi = 1) = P (yi > 0) = P ( i >   Zi     lnwi).
The wage rate depends on a vector of personal, human capital, and job-related
characteristics (Vi). In its semi-log form, the wage equation can be written as
(4) ln wi = Vi   + ui.
Note that wages are observed only for those who are employed. Estimation of struc-
tural employment probabilities for all workers therefore requires prior prediction of
log wages based on estimates obtained from the observed wage sample. With the
predicted wage as an explanatory variable,4 the employment probability of the ith
worker can be written as
(5) P (EMPi = 1) = P ( i >  Zi      lnw ^
i).
Assuming normality of error terms, equations (4) and (5) can be estimated simulta-
neously by a two-stage probit [Lee, 1979] which, in fact, involves a three-step estima-
tion procedure. In the first step, the reduced-form hiring equation is estimated by
probit, which generates the selectivity variable for Heckman’s [1979] two-step esti-
mation of the wage equation. In the second step, the wage equation, corrected for the
selectivity bias, is estimated by ordinary least squares. These wage estimates are
used to generate the predicted wage variable which then is controlled in the struc-
tural hiring equation estimated in step 3 by probit. The structural employment prob-
ability generated from the last stage probit is as follows:
(6) P (EMPi = 1) =     (Zi   +  (Vi   ^))
Using the average   as an estimate of the population mean employment probability,
the relationship between workers’ predicted wages (Vi   ^) and the aggregate unem-
ployment rate (UR) can be expressed as
(7) UR = 1    
_
(Zi   +  (Vi   ^)).
Note that in the presence of wage discrimination, actual wages of employed workers
are biased against females. Consequently, predicted wages obtained from such gen-
der-specific wage samples are likely to be discriminatory. Equation (7) therefore es-
tablishes a straightforward relationship between workers’ discriminatory wages and
the unemployment rate, and thus it provides a convenient tool to examine the effect
of wage discrimination on the equality of male and female unemployment rates.
To test the hypothesis that the unemployment rate equality results partly from
the presence of wage discrimination, it is necessary first to examine whether employ-
ers, in fact, discriminate against women in the payment of wages. Following the lit-
erature, several alternative indicators of wage discrimination are examined in the74 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
remainder of this subsection. All these indicators focus on differences between male
and female wages that remain unexplained by workers’ observed productivity char-
acteristics [Oaxaca, 1973; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994].
Estimation of these unexplained wage differentials requires prior estimation of
wage equations (equation 4) from labor markets with and without discrimination.
Using coefficients of the female wage equation (  ^F), male wage equation (  ^M) and the
pooled wage equation (  ^A) as no-discrimination coefficients,5 three different measures
of unexplained differentials are computed respectively as follows:
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Superscripts M, F and A are used to denote males, females and all workers, respec-
tively; V
_
s denote vectors of average worker characteristics in different samples. Note
that in all the Ds defined above, the variable vectors are for the workers of the same
gender group, whereas the coefficient vectors are for different groups. Thus, these Ds
measure wage differentials that arise due to differences in treatments and not due to
differences in observed characteristics. For example, D1 in equation (8) measures the
premium that a male worker with sample average characteristics receives over the
wage he would have received, had he been treated as a female employee. These Ds
therefore act as good indicators of the presence of discrimination in the labor market
[Oaxaca, 1973].
Viewed from an appropriate nondiscriminatory situation, D1 and D31 represent
males’ gains from discrimination and therefore are interpreted as the employers’
favoritism towards males. D2 and D32, on the other hand, measure females’ losses
due to discrimination and consequently are considered as the employers’ prejudice
against females [Neumark, 1988]. Although they are interpreted differently, both
male favoritism and prejudice against females refer to the same phenomenon: the
presence of discrimination against females.
It is important to note that the unexplained differential is not an exact measure
of discrimination, because in the absence of detailed controls for all possible relevant
job characteristics and person-specific skills [Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995], this dif-
ferential is likely to overestimate the magnitude of discrimination [Blau and Beller,
1988]. However, when the unexplained differential constitutes a large percentage of
the total differential, the possibility of gender discrimination cannot be completely
ruled out [Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998]. In fact, Blau, Ferber, and Winkler con-
clude that even after controlling for a large set of relevant characteristics, more than
50 percent of the male-female wage differential in the U.S. labor market remains
unexplained, and consequently this differential acts as a good indicator (not mea-
sure) of gender discrimination.
In the presence of positive unexplained wage differentials, the hypothesis that
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rectly by estimating the female structural employment probability as a probit (equa-
tion 6) with the estimated discriminatory wage as an explanatory variable,6 and
then comparing the average female employment probability evaluated at discrimi-
natory female wages with that evaluated at wages of comparable male workers, with
other characteristics held constant. If workers’ employment probabilities, as hypoth-
esized earlier, are negatively related to their predicted wages, and if women, in fact,
receive lower discriminatory wages than identical males, the female employment
probabilities evaluated at female wages would invariably be higher than the same
probabilities evaluated at higher male wages. Thus, a decline in female employment
probabilities, when they are evaluated at wages of otherwise identical males, would
confirm that lower female wages result in higher female employment probabilities
which, in turn, lead to lower female unemployment rates.
Sampling Issues and the Sign of the Wage Coefficient
Estimation of relevant employment probabilities and the resulting unemploy-
ment rates raise several sampling issues. It is important to note that the unemploy-
ment rate is traditionally estimated as a ratio of the number of unemployed workers
looking for jobs to total number of workers in the labor force. Consequently, it is
necessary to estimate workers’ employment probabilities and hence the aggregate
unemployment rate from a sample of labor market participants only. This sample
restriction should not, however, be confused with ignoring the role of supply forces in
the determination of workers’ employment probabilities because the supply forces, in
fact, enter the hiring equation indirectly through the predicted wage variable con-
trolled in the second-stage probit.
As pointed out earlier, predicted wages obtained from gender-specific samples
do, in fact, represent workers’ discriminatory wages, and consequently inclusion of
this variable as a regressor in the employer’s hiring equation is crucial to testing the
hypothesis proposed in this study. There are also other justifications for including
this variable in the employer’s hiring decision. First, this wage acts as one of the best
available proxies for the wage that the employer would pay if the worker is hired.
Second, the predicted wage estimated traditionally from a supply driven model acts
as an aspiration or target wage for an unemployed worker, and consequently, from
the point of view of the employer, it serves as an ideal measurable indicator of the
wage expected by the worker. Note that the reservation wage, which influences the
worker’s labor supply decision, depends to a large extent on the market wage, and
moreover, it is hardly observed by the employer. The predicted wage, on the other
hand, provides a close estimatable approximation of not only what the employer would
actually pay, but also to what the worker would actually aspire. These arguments
suggest that the predicted wage is an ideal proxy for the price of labor that the em-
ployer is likely to pay, and consequently its omission from the hiring (labor demand)
equation may result in biased estimates.
It is important to understand the sign of the predicted wage variable in the
employer’s hiring equation because, as pointed out earlier, the test of the proposed
hypothesis relies exclusively on the coefficient of this variable assuming a negative76 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
sign. Note, however, that since the wage rate depends primarily on the worker’s
human capital characteristics, a worker with a higher predicted wage is expected to
be more productive, and therefore is more likely to be hired than someone with a
lower predicted wage. This seemingly contradicts the inverse relationship between
the wage rate (the price of labor) and the employment probability mentioned earlier.
A close scrutiny of the employer’s hiring behavior, however, suggests that this is not
necessarily true in all situations. For example, an engineer, despite his/her higher
education, is less likely to be employed in an administrative support position than
someone who has hardly any college education. This results because a higher wage
predicted for the engineer would make him/her more costly to the employer than a
less-skilled worker who is suitable for the job and would be paid a lower wage.7 The
predicted wage in this example affects the employment probability negatively as
hypothesized earlier.
As pointed out earlier, the predicted wage, which represents the worker’s human
capital endowments, also represents the worker’s aspiration wage, the asking price
for labor. Consequently, like any other price, this wage, with other characteristics
held constant, is likely to influence the employer’s hiring decision negatively. It may
influence the employment probability positively only if the selection is made for a
specific job. For example, if the employer is looking for an electrical engineer, a more
experienced engineer (with higher predicted wage) is more likely to be selected than
an engineer who is relatively less experienced (with lower predicted wage). If, on the
other hand, a single hiring equation that does not distinguish between different kinds
of jobs is estimated from a sample of all workers, the predicted wage, with other
characteristics held constant, is likely to have a negative coefficient, because the pre-
dicted wage in that case is more likely to act as a price of labor than as an instrument
for the productivity of labor. Since this study examines the aggregate unemployment
rate of the economy, the hiring equation has to be estimated from the whole sample,
and consequently the sign of the predicted wage variable in the hiring equation is
expected to be negative. In fact, the empirical estimates of this study reported below
suggest that, other factors remaining constant, higher predicted wages reduce work-
ers’ chances of being hired.8
Note that like wages, employment probabilities of males and females may also
differ between occupations [Gill, 1989, 1994] and between industries [Blau, Ferber,
and Winkler, 1998, 125]. This calls for separate estimation of relevant equations by
occupation [Mohanty, 1998] and by industry. Such a strategy, however, is not fol-
lowed because, as pointed out earlier, the objective of this study is to examine the
relationship between wage discrimination and the general unemployment rate, and
consequently, it is irrelevant to estimate workers’ employment probabilities sepa-
rately by occupation.
DATA
A sample of 67,822 observations was drawn from the 1987 Current Population
Survey Annual Demographic File. The 1987 data were chosen because the official
male and female unemployment rates during this year were exactly identical [Eco-
nomic Report of the President, 2001].9 Of course, with the pre-1994 measurement77 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
error in data collection mentioned earlier, this equality cannot be considered exact.
However, the gap between male and female unemployment rates in 1987 is certainly
one of the smallest ever. This sample consists of those employed and actively search-
ing unemployed workers in the labor force for whom the data on all relevant vari-
ables were available. The sample contains 36,314 males and 31,508 females. The
employed work force in this sample consists of 33,410 males and 29,353 females.
The employer’s hiring decision depends primarily on the worker’s human capital
characteristics, such as completed years of schooling , educational degree, potential
experience, age, and the number of weeks worked during the previous year. Other
variables that may influence the employer’s hiring decision are region of residence,
whether residence is located in an urban area, race, marital status, and income of
other family members. Note that family income represents the economic and social
status of the job applicant’s family, and thus it provides easier access to the job mar-
ket which, in turn, leads to greater likelihood of finding a job.
It is important to note that employment probabilities of men and women may
differ significantly between industries [Bluestone and Harrison, 1988]. For example,
the likelihood of employment in the manufacturing sector is higher for a man than for
a woman. In the service sector, on the other hand, the scenario is just the opposite.
The presence of discrimination may also force women to bid for jobs in the less fa-
vored industries [Bergmann, 1974]. To control for these industry-specific characteris-
tics, the demand-side variables, such as percentages of workers employed in service
and manufacturing industries of the local labor market, are controlled in the hiring
equation.
Another demand side variable that affects the employer’s hiring decision is the
state unemployment rate.10 This variable, to a large extent, represents the local eco-
nomic condition. Since the hiring decision is derived essentially from a labor demand
function, it cannot be independent of the conditions of the local economy. The state-
level data on all these aggregate variables were obtained from Geographic Profile of
Employment and Unemployment, 1987 [April 1988] and were matched with the CPS.
As mentioned earlier, one of the important determinants of employment prob-
ability that has been ignored in the literature is the predicted wage that the employer
would pay if the worker were hired. To estimate this wage, hourly wages of all em-
ployed workers in the sample were obtained by dividing their annual labor earnings
by the number of hours worked during that year. Hourly wages of those who did not
report their annual earnings were obtained from their weekly or hourly earnings.
Employed workers with no data on any one of the three earning variables just men-
tioned were excluded from the sample.
The regressors in the wage equation include essentially the same set of worker
characteristics that are included in the hiring equation. In addition, the wage rate
also depends on the worker’s occupation and industry affiliation. As pointed out ear-
lier, separate estimation by occupation and industry is not pursued in this study be-
cause it is not necessary for testing the proposed hypothesis. However, to control for
their effects on wages, a number of dummy variables representing the worker’s in-
dustry-affiliation and occupation are included as explanatory variables in wage equa-
tions.78 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
It is important to note that the occupational and industry dummy variables in-
cluded in the wage equation appear as explanatory variables in the first-stage re-
duced–form probit. Moreover, these variables are also used to predict wages for all
workers, employed and unemployed, which enter the second stage structural probit
as an explanatory variable. This raises a serious data problem because unemployed
workers do not have occupations or industry affiliations. One way to solve this prob-
lem is to exclude all industry and occupation dummies from the wage regression. This
approach, although a possibility, is not without limitation because the worker’s occu-
pation and industry affiliation are known in the literature as significant determi-
nants of the wage rate, and consequently, their exclusion leads to serious omitted
variable misspecification. A more desirable alternative therefore is to use some suit-
able instruments for these omitted variables. The data on the worker’s longest occu-
pation and industry affiliation available in the CPS provide the desired proxies be-
cause, first, they are available for both employed and unemployed workers, and sec-
ond, they represent industries and occupations that the unemployed workers would
most likely have chosen, had they been employed [Mohanty, 1998].
Combining the information on the longest industry affiliation and the longest
occupation of the unemployed workers with the current occupation and industry af-
filiation of employed workers, several industry and occupational dummy variables
were generated for all workers in the labor force. These variables are used to predict
wages of all workers which enter the second stage structural probit as an explanatory
variable. These variables also enter the first stage probit through the reduced form.
Thus, the problem of unnecessarily omitting the relevant occupational and industry
dummy variables from the wage regression is resolved. All these variables are de-
fined in Appendix A.11
To identify both wage and hiring equations, it is necessary to exclude some vari-
ables from one equation while including them in the other. Variables excluded from
the hiring equation but included in the wage equation are the dummy variables that
represent the worker’s occupation and industry affiliation. The only variable that has
been excluded from the wage equation but included in the hiring equation is the
income of the worker’s other family members. Higher family income, through better
preparation and networking, may improve the worker’s chances of being selected,
but the employer would find it difficult to pay this worker a wage higher than wages
of similar employees with identical characteristics. Consequently this variable acts
as an ideal source of identification in a typical wage-hiring model [Mohanty, 1998].12
It is important to note that the worker’s family income is most unlikely to influ-
ence the employer’s hiring decision directly because it is almost impossible for an
employer to observe the applicant’s family income directly, and moreover, the em-
ployers have no reason to consider one’s family income while making a selection. This
variable, however, does influence the employer’s hiring decision indirectly through
its effects on several other characteristics, such as an impressive job application pack-
age, a more organized presentation technique, effective job contacts and so forth,
which the employers may consider important. Thus, the family income, by being an
ideal proxy for a host of other factors that affect the employer’s hiring decision posi-
tively, acts as an indirect but significant determinant of hiring, and consequently it is
used as an identifying variable in this model. The significance of this variable in the79 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
hiring equation, as reported in the next section, justifies its inclusion as an identifying
restriction. With all these restrictions, both hiring and wage equations are identified.
RESULTS
The first stage probit generates the selectivity variable that enters the wage
equation as a regressor. Wage equations from different samples are then estimated
by Heckman’s two-step method.13 Predicted log wages corrected for the selectivity
bias are presented in Table 1. This table also reports unexplained male-female wage
differentials computed from different equations with different no-discrimination co-
efficient vectors. (See Ds in equations 8, 9 and 10). With the female coefficient vector
 F as the no-discrimination coefficient vector, D1 represents the males’ gain from
discrimination, and in Table 1, it is positive. With the male coefficient vector  M as
the discrimination-free coefficient vector, D2 denotes the females’ loss from discrimi-
nation which also assumes a positive value. As pointed out earlier, both these Ds,
although interpreted differently, refer to the presence of discrimination against fe-
males.
Following Neumark [1988], a third set of discrimination-free coefficients  A are
obtained from the pooled sample. These coefficients have the advantage of separating
the unexplained differential into male favoritism (D31) and bias against females (D32).
Although both D31 and D32 indicate discrimination against women, they may be in-
terpreted as males’ gain and females’ loss respectively in a discriminatory labor mar-
ket relative to an unbiased market. Table 1 shows that both these components are
positive. Thus, irrespective of the type of no-discrimination coefficients used, the evi-
dence suggests that more than 50 percent of the male-female log wage differential
remains unexplained, indicating the presence of wage discrimination against females
in the U.S. labor market.
As discussed earlier, the presence of wage discrimination increases the impor-
tance of the discriminatory wage as a determinant of the worker’s employment prob-
ability. The hiring equations that include the predicted wage as an explanatory vari-
able are estimated in step 3 by probit and are presented in Table 2. For comparison
purposes, hiring equations that completely ignore the role of the wage rate are also
estimated and their log likelihoods are reported in the last row of Table 2. Likelihood
ratio tests between models with and without wage controls (Table 2) reject at all
conventional significance levels the specification that ignores the role of wage rate as
a determinant of the employment probability.14 Note that the coefficient of the pre-
dicted wage variable in all samples assumes a negative sign and is statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, it confirms the presumed inverse relationship between the wage the
employer will have to pay and the worker’s employment probability, with other vari-
ables held constant. Including predicted log wages in the structural hiring equation
improves the sign and significance of several variable coefficients, indicating pos-
sible misspecification when it is omitted.
It is interesting to note that the size of the predicted wage coefficient differs
considerably between male and female employment equations. Since these coeffi-
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change on the employment probability directly, relevant partial derivatives (that is
          [X ]/         [PREDWAGE] =  [X ]  PREDWAGE) are computed from both male and fe-
male samples. They are reported in the last row of Table 2. In absolute value, the
partial derivative in the male sample is approximately four times as large as that in
the female sample, indicating greater sensitiveness of employment probabilities of
males than those of females to changes in wages. On the surface, the smaller partial
derivative associated with the female wage coefficient may appear to be a contradic-
tion to the proposed hypothesis that employers hire more females because their wages
are lower.15 Close scrutiny of this problem, however, reveals that it is the difference
in the male and female demand curves, and not their slopes, that determines the size
of their employment probabilities. Note that, regardless of whether the male demand
curve is flatter or steeper than the female demand curve, a profit-maximizing em-
ployer is most likely to hire female employees as long as their wages are lower than
the wages paid to otherwise identical males, (that is, the demand curve for females
remains below the demand curve for males at every employment level).16 Since this is
guaranteed in a typical labor market characterized by gender discrimination, the
estimated partial derivatives as shown in Table 2 are consistent with, and do not
contradict, the hypothesis that employers hire more females because their wages are
lower.
To test the hypothesis that lower discriminatory wages paid to female workers
result in lower female unemployment rates, female employment probabilities evalu-
ated at discriminatory female wages are compared with those evaluated at wages
paid to otherwise identical males, holding all other characteristics constant.17 The
first row of Table 3 reports these probabilities. They suggest that, all else held con-
stant, the average female employment probability declines (that is, the female unem-
TABLE 1
Estimated Average Log Wage Rates and
Unexplained Male-Female Wage Differentials
Estimated Average Log Wage Rates Unexplained Log Wage
Differential
Males   Females D
No-discrimination __________ ___________
Coefficients    (1) (2) (3)
















  = .4130
Coefficient ( M)  (0.3611)  (0.3649)
















  = .3729
Coefficient ( F)  (0.3216)  (0.3098)
















    = .1614
from the Combined  (0.3418)  (0.3342)
















  = .1536
Sample Size  33,410   29,353
Quantities in parentheses are standard deviations of predicted wages. They should not be confused with
standard deviations of mean predicted wages which can be obtained by dividing the standard deviations
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TABLE 2
Second Stage Structural Probit Estimates with
Discriminatory Predicted Wage as an Explanatory Variable
(Absolute t-ratio in Parentheses)
Variables Males Females All
Constant   .0747  1.0436a  .5015a
(0.415) (5.464) (4.061)
Years of Schooling   .0911a   .0851a   .0987a
(11.673) (8.929) (17.843)
High School   .0080   .0737a   .0431a
(0.300) (2.445) (2.182)
2-year Degree   .0191   .0040   .0071
(0.365) (0.066) (0.183)
4-year Degree   .1396a   .0734   .1175a
(2.640) (1.154) (2.929)
Graduate School   .2914a   .1731b   .1521a
(3.574) (1.860) (2.492)
Years of Experience   .0050   .0071   .0059
(0.738) (0.955) (1.226)
Years of Experience2   .0002b   .0001   .0002
(1.714) (0.444) (1.516)
Number of Weeks Worked  .0270a   .0380a   .0353a
(18.736) (50.920) (66.297)
Income of Other Family Members   .0059a   .0060a   .0061a
(9.389) (7.989) (12.687)
Age 20 to 25   .0883b   .0614   .0390
(1.711) (1.071) (1.039)
Age 26 to 40   .2420a   .0158   .1788a
(3.118) (0.178) (3.136)
Age 41 to 50   .2225a   .0606   .1455b
(1.993) (0.474) (1.744)
Age 51 to 60   .0014   .0730   .0120
(0.010) (0.433) (0.112)
Age 61 or above   .1002   .1785   .0670
(0.546) (0.804) (0.477)
Resides in the South   .0632b   .0578   .0488a
(1.836) (1.498) (1.935)
Resides in the Northeast   .0232   .0369   .0105
(0.538) (0.746) (0.326)
Resides in the Midwest   .0965a   .1006a   .0371
(2.639) (2.325) (1.345)
Resides in an Urban Area   .0184   .0790a   .0249
(0.667) (2.483) (1.205)
Married   .2309a   .1116a   .1739a
(7.866) (3.635) (8.581)
White   .2497a   .2951a   .2630a
(6.432) (7.686) (9.703)
Non- White   .1265b   .3078a   .1892a
(1.755) (3.817) (3.554)
State Unemployment Rate   .0384a   .0483a   .0413a
(4.406) (4.991) (6.463)
Percent Workers in Manufacturing   .0090a   .0007   .0057a
(3.814) (0.243) (3.257)82 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ployment rate rises) by more than two percentage points when female wages are
raised to the same level as wages of identical male workers. This indicates that if
females were paid the same wages as identical males, the female unemployment rate
would have been approximately two percentage points higher than what it actually was.
But since the female workers in the late 1980s were paid lower wages than identical
males, their employment probabilities were higher, and consequently their unem-
ployment rates were lower. Thus, the equality of male and female unemployment
rates in the late 1980s resulted partly from the employers’ ability to pay lower dis-
criminatory wages to females, and not necessarily from their preference for female
employees.
To see if the conclusion drawn above from the 1987 data applies to other years,
two separate samples were drawn from the Current Population Surveys of 1977 and
1996. The procedure used to draw the 1987 sample was also used to draw these two
samples. The year 1977 was chosen because like 1987 it belonged to the prosperity
phase of the business cycle, but unlike 1987 there was a large gap between male and
female unemployment rates. The reason for choosing 1996 is to see whether the re-
sults obtained from the 1970s and the 1980s are still valid in the 1990s. Moreover,
like 1987, this was one of the years in the 1990s when the male and female unemploy-
ment rates were equal.18
Following the procedure discussed above, two-stage probit estimates of hiring
equations were obtained from male and female samples of both 1977 and 1996 data.19
These estimates were used to compute female employment probabilities reported in
the second and third rows of Table 3. The female employment probabilities in the first
column are evaluated at the discriminatory female wages, whereas those in the sec-
ond column are evaluated at wages paid to otherwise identical males. These esti-
mates suggest that had women employees been paid the wages paid to identical males,
their average employment probabilities would have been approximately two percent-
TABLE 2 (cont.)
Second Stage Structural Probit Estimates with Discriminatory
Predicted Wage as an Explanatory Variable
(Absolute t-ratio in parentheses)
Variables Males Females All
Percent Workers in Services   .0161a   .0154a   .0186a
(3.593) (3.008) (5.592)
Predicted Log Wages   .8460a   .2824a   .7853a
(10.929) (3.520) (18.448)
Sample Size 36,314  31,508  67,822
Log Likelihood  7222.69  5491.69  12771.55
Log Likelihood  7284.03  5497.88  12945.64
  without any
  wage control
(          (X )/         (PREDWAGE)   .1258   .0374   —
a. Significant at the 5 percent level.
b. Significant at the 10 percent level.83 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
age points lower in both 1977 and 1996, and consequently their unemployment rates
would have been two percentage points higher. But since they were paid lower dis-
criminatory wages, it was profitable for employers to hire female workers, and conse-
quently their unemployment rates were lower. These lower unemployment rates there-
fore do not necessarily indicate the absence of discrimination against female employees.
The results obtained from the 1977 and 1996 data add significantly to the ro-
bustness of the finding that lower female wages lead to higher female employment
probabilities. Thus, regardless of the time period considered, the study confirms that
the presence of wage discrimination against women invariably lowers the female
unemployment rate, and as a result, helps to narrow the observed gap between male
and female unemployment rates. This is one of the reasons why the male and female
unemployment rates were equal in the late 1980s and 1990s.
The question then arises, If the presence of wage discrimination against females
leads to a zero unemployment rate gap, as was the case during the 1980s and 1990s,
why did male and female unemployment rates remain far apart in the 1970s when
the extent of wage discrimination against females was even more severe than what
was experienced in the 1980s?20 In fact, compared to the female-male wage ratio of
.65 in the year 1987, the female-male wage ratio in 1977 was .589 [O’Neill and Polachek,
1993, 206]. Despite this wider discrepancy between male and female wages in 1977,
the female unemployment rate in this year, as reported in the footnote 18, was ap-
proximately two percentage points higher than the male unemployment rate. This
clearly suggests that the presence of wage discrimination is not necessarily the only
factor that reduces the unemployment rate disparity to zero. The convergence in un-
employment rates results primarily from changes in a host of other factors over time,
and the presence of wage discrimination simply adds to that process.
It has already been demonstrated by several authors that an increase in women’s
schooling, a rise in their work experience, a change in their preference for different
occupations etc. have contributed significantly to the narrowing of the gender gaps in
the 1980s.21 This convergence is also attributed partly to a decline in employers’
TABLE 3
Average Female Employment Probabilities
Evaluated at Female and Male Wages
Average Female Average Female
Year Sample P (EMP=1) With P (EMP=1) With
Size Female Wages Male Wages
1987 31,508  .9311  .9136
(.0007) (.0009)
1977 26,258  .9032  .8747
(.0062) (.0011)
1996 26,828  .9457  .9270
(.0007) (.0009)
Quantities in parentheses are standard deviations of the mean probabilities which are obtained by divid-
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discriminatory treatments towards female employees in the 1980s and 1990s. The
current study does not address this issue nor does it examine the factors that led to
this convergence. It simply suggests that regardless of the causes of convergence, the
presence of wage discrimination in the labor market against females, by lowering
female unemployment rates, helps to narrow the gap between male and female un-
employment rates still further.
As pointed out above, the extent of gender discrimination, which according to
Becker’s theory invariably lowers both employment and wages of females, was more
severe in the 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, the positive impact of
lower discriminatory female wages on female employment probabilities was not strong
enough to completely eliminate the large gaps between male and female unemploy-
ment rates, and thus the unemployment rate gap continued to persist during the
1970s. However, with a significant decline in the extent of labor market discrimina-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s, and a rise in women’s human capital endowments, both
gender gaps in wages and employment started to show declining trends, and conse-
quently the impact of lower discriminatory female wages on female employment was
good enough to completely eliminate the already narrow unemployment rate gap
during this period. The study thus confirms that the convergence of male and female
unemployment rates in the U.S. labor market, although real, was not truly complete
in the 1980s and 1990s. It was the presence of wage discrimination, which by lower-
ing the female unemployment rate still further bridged the remaining gap, leading to
an equality of observed male and female unemployment rates. This equality should
not therefore be confused with the true absence of gender discrimination in the 1980s
and 1990s.
DISCRIMINATORY WAGE AND UNEXPLAINED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
DIFFERENTIAL
The conclusion drawn in the last section follows directly from the specification of
the hiring equation that recognizes the importance of workers’ predicted wages as a
determinant of the employers’ hiring decision. The coefficient of this wage variable is
not only significantly different from zero, but also is large enough in absolute value to
reveal the true differential, which otherwise remains disguised. To show the impor-
tance of this variable from another perspective, this section estimates the unexplained
unemployment rate differential under different specifications, and finds the evidence
that exclusion of the discriminatory wage rate from the hiring equation may, in fact,
change the sign and the size of this differential.
Following Johnson [1983] and using the coefficients obtained separately from male
sample, female sample and the sample of all workers as the no-discrimination coeffi-
cients, three alternative measures of unexplained employment probability differen-
tials (or unemployment rate differentials) are obtained respectively as follows:
(11) D* 1 =  
_
 (XM  ^M)    
_
 (XM  ^F)
(12) D* 2 =   
_
 (XF  ^M)    
_
 (XF  ^F)85 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
(13) D* 3 = D* 31 + D* 32 = [ 
_
 (XM  ^M)    
_
 (XM  ^A)] + [(XF  ^A)    
_
 (XF  ^F),
where superscripts M, F and A denote males, females and all workers respectively.  
_
denotes the sample average of     (Xi  ^) , Xi = [Zi, (Vi  ^)], and   ^' = [  ^',   ^].
To examine the effects of discriminatory wages on unexplained unemployment
rate differentials, D*s defined in equations (11)-(13) are obtained from hiring equa-
tions with and without discriminatory wage controls. The unexplained differentials
estimated from equations with non-discriminatory wage controls are also computed
to compare them with those obtained from equations with discriminatory wage con-
trols. To compute these unexplained differentials, average employment probabilities
of males and females from equations with and without wage controls are estimated
for all three years and are reported in Table 4 (1977A, 1987A, 1996A).22 Column 1
presents the probabilities estimated from the hiring equations that do not control for
any wage rate. The probabilities in column 3, on the other hand, are based on dis-
criminatory wage controls.23 To facilitate comparison, hiring equations are also esti-
mated with Neumark-type discrimination-free wage controls.24 These coefficients are
used to estimate average employment probabilities which are presented in column 2
of Table 4 (1977A, 1987A, and 1996A).
Employment probabilities in Table 4 are used to compute unexplained employ-
ment probability differentials defined in this section. They are presented in Table 4
(1977B, 1987B, 1996B). Note that in the 1977 sample, the unexplained differential
D*
1, which assumes   ^F as the no-discrimination coefficient vector, is negative when
the role of the wage rate is completely ignored or a discrimination-free wage is con-
trolled in the hiring equation (see columns 1 and 2, 1977B). However, it becomes
positive when the discriminatory wage is included as an explanatory variable (see
column 3, 1977B). A similar situation emerges when the male coefficient vector   ^M is
considered discrimination-free. In this case, the unexplained differential D*
2 is found
to be negative in columns 1 and 2, but positive in column 3. The Neumark measures
of unexplained differentials, D*
31 and D*
32, also follow exactly the same pattern. The
results in Table 4 (1977B) have interesting implications. A positive unexplained em-
ployment probability differential results only when the predicted discriminatory wage
rate, which the employer would most likely pay if the worker is hired, is controlled in
the hiring equation, and it vanishes when this wage is omitted or a nondiscrimina-
tory wage is included.
The results for the 1987 data are very similar to those for 1977. In column 3 of
1987B, all unexplained differentials except the first one are positive, whereas they
are all negative in columns 1 and 2. Interestingly, the unexplained differentials in
both 1977 and 1987 data decline significantly in absolute value when discriminatory
wages are controlled in the hiring equations. The 1996 data present very similar
results. Although only one out of four D*s assumes a positive value (column 3, 1996B),
a comparison between column 1 and column 3 suggests that the inclusion of discrimi-
natory wage control in the hiring equation invariably lowers the size of the unex-
plained unemployment rate differential.
The residual difference exercise in this section provides further support to the
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TABLE 4
Average Hiring Probabilities and
Differentials With and Without Wage Controls
No Wage Discrimination-free Discriminatory Wage
Wage (full sample) (gender-specific sample)
 (1)  (2)  (3)
1977 Sample
A. Estimated Average Hiring Probabilities
 (XM M)  .9165  .9164  .9164
(.1422) (.1427) (.1425)
 (XM F)  .9314  .9174  .9099
(.1237) (.1357) (.1522)
 (XM M)  .8809  .8877  .9151
(.1687) (.1655) (.1282)
 (XF F)  .9033  .9029  .9032
(.1454) (.1511) (.1461)
 (XM A)  .9239  .9191  .8965
(.1313) (.1374) (.1752)




1  .0149  .0010  .0065
D*
2  .0224  .0152  .0119
D*
31  .0074  .0027  .0199
D*
32  .0105  .0037  .0074
1987 Sample
A. Estimated Average Hiring Probabilities
 (XM M) .9201  .9201  .9200
(.1366) (.1378) (.1383)
 (XM F) .9442  .9362  .9280
 (.1104) (.1205) (.1380)
 (XF M) .9013  .9111  .9584
(.1535) (.1465) (.0683)
 (XF F) .9311  .9310  .9311
(.1234) (.1260) (.1234)
 (XM A) .9322  .9271  .9032
(.1216) (.1292) (.1702)




1  .0241  .0161  .0080
D*
2  .0298  .0199  .0273
D*
31  .0121  .0070  .0168
D*
32  .0142  .0083  .008587 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
only the actual unemployment rate differential, but also the unexplained part of this
differential. The true differentials are revealed only when discriminatory wages are
controlled in the hiring decision. This reinforces the importance of this wage variable
as a determinant of the employer’s hiring decision. Its omission therefore is likely to
result in misspecification leading to biased conclusions.25
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Using data from the Current Population Surveys of 1977, 1987 and 1996, this
study demonstrates that in the presence of wage discrimination against females, the
ability of the employer to pay lower discriminatory wages to female workers raises
average female employment probabilities which, in turn, yields lower female unem-
ployment rates. This is one of the several other reasons why male and female unem-
ployment rates were equal in the late 1980s. The study finds the evidence that if
female wages were raised to the level of wages paid to identical male workers, female
unemployment rates in the 1980s would have been approximately 2 percentage points
higher than male unemployment rates. The equality of male and female unemploy-
TABLE 4 (cont.)
Average Hiring Probabilities and
Differentials With and Without Wage Controls
No Wage Discrimination-free Discriminatory Wage
Wage (full sample) (gender-specific sample)
 (1)  (2)  (3)
1996 Sample
A. Estimated Average Hiring Probabilities
 (XM M) .9304  .9304  .9304
(.1286) (.1290) (.1287)
 (XM F) .9510  .9478  .9380
 (.1036) (.1078) (.1253)
 (XF M) .9147  .9172  .9206
(.1450) (.1435) (.1383)
 (XF F) .9410  .9409  .9457
(.1153) (.1166) (.1124)
 (XM A) .9411  .9394  .9295
(.1140) (.1166) (.1331)




1  .0206  .0174  .0076
D*
2   .0263  .0237  .0251
D*
31   .0107  .0090  .0009
D*
32   .0121  .0102  .0098
Quantities in the parentheses are standard deviations of predicted probabilities (and not of mean pre-
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ment rates in the 1980s and 1990s should not therefore be confused with the absence
of hiring discrimination against females. The current study further demonstrates
that the predicted wage rate is, in fact, a significant determinant of the hiring deci-
sion. Its inclusion in the wage equation as an explanatory variable improves the
model specification and thus yields more reliable estimates.
I conclude with a few notes of caution. First, like other discrimination studies, the
estimates in this study may suffer from omitted variable bias. Consequently, the Ds
and D*s should be treated only as indicators of discrimination and not as measures of
discrimination. Second, the reliability of the results from a simultaneous equations
model depends primarily on the identification of the model. Due to the problem of
finding suitable identifying restrictions, both wage and hiring equations in this model
are identified by “income of other family members” only. Imposing other identifying
restrictions may improve the results, and therefore the findings of this study should
be carefully interpreted.
 Third, preference for different occupations differs between men and women.
Moreover, occupational segregation may force women to choose low-paying jobs. Esti-
mation of employment probabilities separately by occupation therefore may yield in-
teresting results. Although it is not difficult to reestimate this model separately for
different occupational groups [Mohanty, 1998], such a strategy has not been followed
here because the study focuses primarily on the aggregate unemployment rate which
ought to be estimated from the whole sample only. The findings of this study should
not therefore be generalized to particular occupations.
The current study focuses exclusively on the effects of wage discrimination on the
employer’s demand for female workers and does not address its effects on labor sup-
ply. If the disincentive effects of wage discrimination, as demonstrated by Baldwin
and Johnson [1992], are introduced into this model, the female employment prob-
abilities would rise still further and the unemployment rate gap would be still smaller.
The equality of unemployment rates in the late 1980s and 1990s in the United States
therefore results partly from both supply and demand effects of gender wage dis-
crimination. It should not exclusively be attributed to a greater demand for low-paid
female workers. Lower supply of female labor resulting from wage discrimination
plays an important role as well. Irrespective of whether wage discrimination affects
supply forces more than the demand forces or demand forces more than the supply
forces, the fact remains that in the presence of discrimination, they both contribute to
an increase in the average female employment probability, leading to a decline in the
female unemployment rate. Since several empirical studies find the evidence of sig-
nificant wage discrimination against females in the U.S. labor market, equality of
male and female unemployment rates in the 1980s may be attributed partly to the
presence of this discrimination.
Finally, the conclusion of this study that the presence of wage discrimination
against females lowers the female unemployment rate remains valid regardless of
the time period considered. However, this does not necessarily suggest that wage
discrimination by lowering the female unemployment rate would invariably lead to a
zero unemployment rate gap. The true convergence of unemployment rates, in fact,
depends on a host of other factors, such as changes in women’s education, experience,
job attachment and so forth. The current study does not address that issue. While89 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
recognizing and not contradicting the roles of other factors that contributed to the
narrowing of female-male unemployment rate gaps, it simply suggests that this con-
vergence, although real, was not truly complete during the late 1980s and 1990s. It
was the presence of wage discrimination against females which by further lowering
the female unemployment rate led to the observed equality of male and female un-
employment rates during this period. Interestingly, this conclusion does not dispute
the widely known fact that the extent of gender discrimination in the U.S. labor
market declined considerably during the 1980s and 1990s. It simply suggests that, in
spite of this decline, the era of gender discrimination was not truly over during this
period and that the equality of unemployment rates was partly due to the presence of
wage discrimination against females in the U.S. labor market.
The conclusion drawn in the above paragraph has important policy implications.
It suggests that just by observing the equality of male and female unemployment
rates, policymakers should not blindly conclude that the era of gender discrimination
in the labor market has ended because the very presence of this discrimination in the
payment of wages may have contributed to the equality of observed unemployment
rates. A comprehensive study of gender discrimination therefore should consider both
wage discrimination and hiring discrimination simultaneously. In addition, the study
also suggests that any policy having an impact on employment must include wages,
(the price of labor), as a determinant. Failure to do so may result in biased estimates,
leading to unrealistic and misleading conclusions (see footnote 25).
NOTES
The author thanks Miles Finney, Neil Garston, Arturo Gonzalez, Judd Hammack, John Heywood,
Mann Yoon, participants of the Labor Market session of the Western Economic Association confer-
ence at San Francisco, three anonymous referees, and the editor of this Journal for helpful com-
ments. The usual caveats apply.
1. Note that the convergence of male and female unemployment rates during the 1980s, despite the
measurement error in the CPS data, was real. In other words, there is no denying the fact that the
gap between observed unemployment rates converged nearly to zero, if not exactly to zero, in the late
1980s and the 1990s.
2. In 1987, white women constituted 85.7 percent of the total employed female population [Economic
Report of the President, 2001].
3. The employment probability of a worker is defined as the likelihood of being hired by the employer
given his/her presence in the labor force.
4. The predicted wage rate of an unemployed worker is the amount that he/she would receive if treated
the same as an employed worker with identical characteristics.
5. No-discrimination coefficients or discrimination-free coefficients are assumed to prevail in a labor
market that is free from employers’ discriminatory practices. See Oaxaca [1973], and Oaxaca and
Ransom [1994] for a detailed discussion of different types of no-discrimination coefficients used in
the literature.
6. In examining the employment effects of wage discrimination against females from a labor supply
perspective, Baldwin and Johnson [1992] estimated non-discriminatory employment probabilities by
including the worker’s discriminatory offer wage differential as an explanatory variable in the em-
ployment equation.
7. Another reason why the engineer will not be hired as an administrative support worker is that he/she
may have applied for this job due to some personal reasons and is very likely to quit as soon as better
opportunities are available.90 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
8. The conclusion on the negative sign of the wage variable remains unchanged irrespective of the
specification of the hiring equation and samples used.
9. Both male and female unemployment rates during 1987 were 6.2 percent.
10. Many studies use Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level data on aggregate variables because the
state level data may be too global to capture the variations in economic activities within the state.
There are two reasons for using the state level aggregate variables in this study. First, the use of the
MSA level data reduces the sample size drastically (by more than 50 percent) because workers living
outside MSAs and those living in the MSAs, listed in the Geographic Profile and not in the CPS, are
unnecessarily excluded from the sample. Such a sample cannot be a representative of the national
population. Second, my unreported results indicate that sign and statistical significance of almost all
the variables remain unchanged when state level aggregate variables are replaced by their MSA
level counterparts. In other words, no generality is lost when state level aggregate variables are used
in appropriate estimating equations.
11. Means and standard deviations of the variables are not reported to save space but can be obtained
from the author on request.
12. It is important to note that, with a few exceptions, the variables that affect the employer’s hiring
decision are also the variables that determine the worker’s wage. Consequently, the scope for choos-
ing appropriate identifying variables is extremely limited.
13. These estimates may be obtained from the author on request.
14. For example, in the male equation, the estimated chi-square is 2(7,284.03 7,222.69) = 122.68, whereas
the critical value of the chi-square at one percent level of significance and with one degree of freedom
is 6.535.
15. I thank a reviewer for raising the issue of this apparent contradiction.
16. A graphical solution of this proposition can be obtained from the author on request.
17. These wages are obtained by computing the vector product of female characteristics and male wage
coefficients.
18. Male and female unemployment rates in 1977 were 6.3 and 8.2 respectively, whereas they were both
5.4 percent in the year 1996 [Economic Report of the President, 2001].
19. These estimates may be obtained from the author on request.
20. I thank a reviewer for raising and providing insights to this important issue.
21. In a different context, O’Neill and Polachek [1993] have demonstrated that one-third of the conver-
gence in male-female wage differentials during the 1980s was due to increase in women’s schooling
and experience.
22. The probabilities in Table 4 are, in fact, the averages of individual employment probabilities which
are different from employment probabilities of workers with sample average characteristics [Johnson,
1983].
23. The predicted wage rates controlled in the second stage male hiring equations are obtained from
male samples. Similarly, wage rates controlled in structural female hiring equations are obtained
form female samples.
24. Following Neumark’s [1988] approach, a set of discrimination-free coefficients are obtained from the
pooled sample of both male and female workers.
25. Earlier studies considered a positive unexplained employment probability differential as an indicator
of the presence of hiring discrimination [Johnson, 1983; Mohanty, 1998]. Based on that criterion, the
findings of this study suggest that in the absence of a control for the discriminatory wage rate in the
employment equation, there is no evidence of hiring discrimination against females in the U.S. labor
market. This conclusion, however, is reversed or weakened when the predicted wage is controlled as
an explanatory variable in the hiring equation.91 EXPLANATION FOR THE EQUALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
APPENDIX A
Definition of Variables Used in Wage and Hiring Equations
  Used in   Used in
Variable Definition   Wage   Hiring
  Equationa Equationa
GRADE = Years of schooling completed Y Y
HIGHSCHL = 1, if the worker has a highschool diploma Y Y
COLLEGE1 = 1, if the worker has a 2-years college degree Y Y
COLLEGE2 = 1, if the worker has a 4-years college degree Y Y
GRADUATE = 1, if the worker has Masters or Ph. D. degree Y Y
EXP = AGE   GRADE   5Y Y
EXP2 = EXP squared Y Y
YOUTH = 1, if aged between 20 and 25 years Y Y
ADULT1 = 1, if aged between 26 and 40 years Y Y
ADULT2 = 1, if aged between 41 and 50 years Y Y
ADULT3 = 1, if aged between 51 and 60 years Y Y
ADULT4 = 1, if the worker’s age is 61 or above Y Y
WKWKLSYR = Number of weeks worked during the previous year Y Y
FAMINC = Income of other family members (in ,000 of $) N Y
SOUTH = 1, if the worker belongs to the South Y Y
MIDWEST = 1, if the worker belongs to the Midwest Y Y
NORTHEAST = 1, if the worker belongs to the Northeast Y Y
WHITE = 1, if the worker is white Y Y
OTHRRACE = 1, if the worker is nonwhite and nonblack Y Y
CENTCITY = 1, if the worker lives in a inner cities Y Y
MARRIED = 1, if the worker is married and the spouse is present Y Y
URATE = The unemployment rate of the state Y Y
in which the worker lives
MNFPCT = The state employment percentage in Y Y
the manufacturing sector
SERVPCT = The state employment percentage in the service sector Y Y
LONGMANF = 1, if has worked longest in manufacturing Y N
LONGTRNS = 1, if has worked longest in transportation Y N
LONGTRAD = 1, if has worked the longest in trading (retail and whole- Y N
sale), banking, communication and utility industries
LONGSERV = 1, if has worked longest in service sector Y N
LONGPBAD = 1, if has worked longest in public administration industry Y N
LONGMNGR = 1, if the longest job of the worker is in Y N
managerial position
LONGPROF = 1, if longest prefessional job Y N
LONGTECH = 1, if longest technician job Y N
LONGSALE = 1, if longest sales occupation Y N
LONGADMN = 1, if longest administrative support occ Y N
LONGSROP = 1, if longest service occupation Y N
PREDWAGE = OLS estimate of ln w N Y
Dependent Variable in the Wage Equation
ln w = natural log of the wage rate per hour
Dependent Variable in the Hiring Equation
EMP = 1, if the worker is currently employed and 0 otherwise
a. Y = Yes (i.e., the variable is included among regressors); N = No; (that is, the variable is not included).92 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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